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Gardner, 1983, 1993a, 1993b; Kay & Rogers, 1998; Matthew, 1990; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988; Weisberg, 1993).
A paradigm shift toward a domain-specific view of
creativity is occurring in the study of creativity. Recent
theoretical (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Feldman, 1980, 1982,
1994; Gardner, 1983) and empirical (Baer, 1991, 1993) literature suggests that creativity may be a more specific
trait than was once believed. Wallach (1985) indicated
that developmental research on creativity is undergoing a shift away from the general toward the specific
view and suggested that giftedness as well as creativity are much more domain-specific than was first understood. The recent focus on domain-specific knowledge

Abstract

One of the most controversial issues in contemporary research on creativity-whether a person’s creativity is domain-specific or domain-general-was investigated with 109 second-grade children. The purposes of
this study were to (1) provide empirical support for the
domain-specific theory of creativity, (2) show relationships among children’s creative performances as measured by three product-based assessments in three domains (storytelling, collage making, and math word
problems), and (3) explore the relationship between
children’s creative performances and their general creative thinking skills, as measured by the Wallach-Kogan Creative Thinking Test and the Real- World Divergent Thinking Test. The findings of this study support
the position of domain-specificity of creativity. Children
exhibited a range of creative abilities across different domains, rather than a uniform creative ability in diverse
domains, indicating there is considerable intra-individual variation in creative ability by domain. Divergent
thinking measures in this study did not predict creative
performance in at least two of three, if not all, domains
assessed in the study. Implications of the study in connection with educational practices for gifted children
are discussed.
* * * *
he supposition that human creativity is a generalized ability-similar irrespective of the kind of discipline or subject matter involved-has guided much of
the research and theory development in the study of
creativity over the last 50 years (Barron, 1988; Guilford,
1967; Hocevar, 1980; Milgram & Milgram, 1976; Plucker,
1998; Runco, 1986; Torrance, 1966, 1988). Many researchers today still propose that creativity is applicable
across domains or disciplines (Feldhusen & Goh, 1995;
Kay & Rogers, 1998; Taylor, 1988; Torrance, 1988). However, some recent research has argued against the existence of general creative thinking skills, and skepticism
is growing toward the domain-general theory of creativity (Baer, 1993; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Feldman, 1980;

Putting the Research to Use
The results of this study suggest at least five practical
implications for educators.
First, using multiple assessments in diverse domains
and performance-based assessments within real
learning contexts are essential to assessing properly the different kinds of creative abilities in various children.
Second, relying only on divergent thinking tests to
identify creative children should be avoided.
Third, educators should make a greater effort to develop appropriate means for assessing and validating diverse creative abilities.
Fourth, individualized and domain-based teaching
approaches, coordinated with current programs for
teaching thinking skills or problem-solving skills,
are necessary to address the increasing diversity in
our school systems. Focusing less on labeling (Who
is not creative?) and more on assessment diagnosis
of children’s abilities and needs is also helpful.
Fifth, intensive teacher training on attitudes toward
the definition of and criteria for creativity and for
the use of alternative or nontraditional assessments
of creativity in children are essential to connect research and practice.
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has been regarded as the most dramatic shift to date in
the study of creativity and giftedness (Feldman, 1994;
Runco & Nemiro, 1994).
Driving this philosophical shift has been an increasing objection to the heavy emphasis placed on divergent
thinking measures as an index of a general capacity for
creativity (e.g., Anastasi, 1982; Baer, 1991, 1993; Brown,
1989; Milgram, 1990; Runco & Nemiro, 1994). Although
divergent thinking tests may predict creative achievement under some conditions, the validity of these tests
has been questioned because of the concern that high
scores may not always predict creative achievement
(e.g., Baer, 1993). There is also limited convincing evidence that children judged creative in one domain/discipline necessarily display strong divergent thinking
skills (Gardner, 1993a, 1993b). Researchers have started
to report that divergent thinking cannot be equated with
creativity and that individual knowledge domains do
play an important role in understanding and measuring
creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Feldman, 1980; Gardner, 1983).
Divergent thinking might not be as valid as we have
thought (Hong & Milgram, 1991; Runco, 1993). However, some recent research on divergent thinking has reported quite respectable predictive validity coefficients
(Runco), which suggests that divergent thinking can be
a useful estimate of potential for some creative and original performances. Runco also warned that researchers
who regard divergent thinking as entirely invalid or unimportant may be ignoring recent empirical research.
Conclusions, therefore, about creativity’s domaingenerality and -specificity remain inconsistent, inconclusive, and not clear-cut at all. Studies lack a clear
and agreed upon result and conclusion and are open
to a plethora of individual interpretations. Creativity
has been argued as domain-general, as domain-specific, or as both depending upon the restricted theory,
database used, or both. For example, some contemporary researchers of creativity seem to agree on the
domain-specificity of creativity at least theoretically
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Gardner, 1993a, 1993b); however, their position lacks sufficient empirical support.
There also have been research studies that introduced
creativity as both a domain-general and -specific construct and empirically distinguished them (Hong, Milgram, & Gorsky, 1995), but their conclusions lacked
solid theoretical foundations and further research support. Finally, the dichotomy in research findings may
be caused by methodological problems, such as methods and statistics used. Bivariate analyses appear to favor specificity while multivariate analyses tend to find
evidence for the domain-generality of creativity. Per-
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formance-based assessments often produce evidence
of specificity, while self-report scales suggest evidence
for generality. In sum, the rush to characterize creativity as domain-general or -specific may be premature
because of selective interpretation of theory, significant methodological limitations, and circuitous logic
(Plucker, 1998). Further evidence is needed to inform
the debate.
Rationale and Purpose of the Study
The domain-specific view of creativity was influenced strongly by the multiple intelligences theory in
which Gardner (1983) proposed seven (later eight) distinct kinds of intelligences or domains of cognitive activity. Gardner (1988) suggested that we should no longer speak of an individual as being creative; instead, we
should make an effort to recognize the possibility of a
person’s creativity in specific domains. Some educators
in the field of gifted education have adopted Gardner’s
view and have begun to consider giftedness as “domainspecific and not simply a general indicator of intellectual ability” (Feldman, 1994, p. 8). Although several intelligence and measurement researchers have cautioned
educators that multiple intelligences theory still has relatively little research support (Matthew, 1988), Gardner’s view is well accepted among some gifted educators because it emphasizes the breadth, pluralism, and
diversity of individuals’ competencies.
The issue of the domain-specificity or -generality of
creativity is important and controversial because it has
broad implications for the identification of and educational practices used with creative children. For example, denying the domain-general approach to creativity is similar to denying the existence of general creative
thinking skills and, therefore, is equal to denying the
importance of divergent thinking in understanding and
assessing creativity. Such a view is a huge threat to the
most current practices used for identifying creativity
and giftedness in school-age children (Baer, 1993). Because no clear definition of creativity dominates the literature, many professionals have used divergent thinking ability to define creativity. The terms creativity and
divergent thinking may even be used rather interchangeably. Some educators believe that creativity is what divergent thinking tests measure, as intelligence is what
an intelligence test measures.
Baer (1994a) pointed out that each year millions of
children take general creative thinking tests, such as divergent thinking tests, under the assumption that creativity is a general trait that runs across diverse domains
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and that the identification of highly divergent thinkers
is equivalent to identifying creative learners. Furthermore, some researchers still advocate using these tests
for selection of gifted students and as outcome measures
for evaluating creativity training programs (Cramond,
1994). If the assumption that creativity is domain-general is wrong, the current educational practice for identifying creative children is both “a waste of educational
resources and an unfair basis for making placement decisions” (Baer, p. 80). In addition, the domain issue of
creativity also has numerous implications for the design of educational programs that attempt to stimulate
or enhance children’s creative abilities (Plucker, 1998).
If creativity is a domain-general trait, training of general creative skills will be an effective way to enhance
children’s creative abilities. On the contrary, if creativity is domain-specific, children’s individual creative
abilities will be best fostered within the context of particular talent areas (Plucker). For these reasons, Plucker
suggested that research on the domain-generality and
domain-specificity of creativity is necessary, important,
and should continue.
Furthermore, although there is a growing interest in
the domain-specific theory of creativity, the research
supporting this view still remains quite limited (Baer,
1998; Bamberger, 1990; Plucker, 1998; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). Authors who support a domain-specificity
view of creativity have not always addressed their arguments in a thoroughly convincing manner (Kogan, 1994;
Plucker), and most studies exploring this issue have
been limited in several ways.
First, most studies that have explored the domain issue of creativity have been limited to the use of a selfreport scale as a measure of creative performance in
diverse domains, resulting in support for creativity’s
domain-generality (Hocevar, 1980; Milgram & Milgram, 1976; Runco, 1986, 1987). Although some researchers suggest that self-report scales are conceptually and psychometrically reasonable measures,
especially when the creative accomplishment is measured (Hocevar), self-report scales have been criticized
for their lack of reliability and validity in assessing creative abilities (especially in young children; Brown,
1989). Performance-based or product-based assessments using expert consensus (Amabile, 1983, 1996)
have been strongly recommended instead for assessing children’s creative abilities in diverse domains. Although performance-based assessment is not without
its problems, such as a lack of generality, increased cost,
more involved scoring, and so on, performance-based
assessment is well accepted because it embeds assessment in meaningful, intelligence-fair, real-world activ-
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ities. However, few studies to date have used performance-based assessments; those that have were limited
to a single or a few performance-based assessments in
one or two domains. In addition, very few studies have
used expert consensus in evaluating children’s performance-based products to explore the question of creativity’s domain-specificity or -generality.
Second, although researchers have shown interest
in looking at the relationship between divergent thinking and creative performances, few studies have paid
attention to the relationships among children’s diverse
creative performances in diverse domains. Researchers
have been mainly interested in criterion-related validity (concurrent or predictive) of divergent thinking measures in predicting creative performances. However, exploration of interrelations among a person’s creative
performances in different domains is essential in investigating the question of the domain-specificity and -generality of creativity.
Third, no study to date has utilized a battery of divergent thinking tests to explore the domain-specificity and domain-generality issue. Most studies have relied on a single divergent thinking test, thereby lacking
the support of an adequate database. Since the correlations among various divergent thinking tests suggest
that each taps various aspects of divergent thinking (Kogan, 1994), the use of a battery of divergent thinking
tests would be necessary for careful examination of the
domain issue.
Fourth, it has been suggested that divergent thinking
tests would be more predictive of real-world creative
performances if they contained problems children might
encounter in their school or home settings (Hong & Milgram, 1991; Okuda, Runco, & Berger, 1991; Runco, 1993;
Runco & Okuda, 1988). However, the studies utilizing
real-world divergent thinking tasks have correlated results only with self-report scales as measures of creative
performances in diverse domains. There has been no
published study that looks at the relationship between
a real-world divergent thinking test and children’s creative performances in diverse domains utilizing performance-based assessments.
Finally, most studies in this area have involved older
subjects (e.g., high school students, college students).
Published studies on young children (age 3-8 years) in
this area have been meager (Godwin & Moran, 1990;
Hennessey & Amabile, 1988) and limited to small sample sizes (e.g., Baer, 1991). Since early identification and
early nurturing of creative children are believed essential for optimal educational and social outcomes of
gifted children (Milgram, 1990), examination of this issue with younger and larger samples is important.
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Thus, the purpose of the present study was to investigate the issue of the domain-specificity and domaingenerality of creativity in young children. To examine this issue, this study explored (1) the relationships
among children’s creative performances in three domains and (2) the relationships between children’s general creative thinking skills and children’s creative performances in three domains. Children’s performances in
language, art, and math domains were judged by nine
expert judges who rated children’s creativity in storytelling, collage-making, and math word-problem-creating tasks. Children’s general creative thinking skills
were assessed by a battery of two divergent thinking
tests, including subtests of the Wallach- Kogan Creativity Test (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) and the Real World Divergent Thinking Test adapted from the work of Okuda,
Runco, and Berger (1991).
Method
Subjects
One-hundred and nine second-grade children from
five urban elementary schools, 53 (49%) boys and 56
(51%) girls, participated in the present study. The age
range of the subjects varied from 7.01 (85 months) to
8.09 (104 months) years, with a mean of 7.10 years (93.7
months) and a standard deviation of 4.4 months.
Instruments
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test. Two verbal subtests
(Alternate Uses and Similarities) and one nonverbal
subtest (Pattern Meanings) of the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test were selected for the present study. Each
verbal or nonverbal subtest had three items in it. In addition, the Wallach- Kogan Creativity Test was modified
to include problem-finding tasks. It has been suggested
that problem-finding tasks enhance the validity of divergent thinking tests as measures of creativity (Wakefield, 1985, 1992). Therefore, three items in each subtest
were composed of two problem-solving tasks and one
problem-finding task. The problem-solving tasks in each
subtest asked children to tell all the different ways they
could use an object, how two objects are alike, or all the
things a pattern could be. The problem-finding task in
each subtest asked children to generate a problem and
then provide a solution to it. For example, a problemfinding task in the Pattern Meanings subtest was “Here
is a blank card and a pencil. Make a pattern of your
own, then tell me all the different things it could be.”
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Scoring followed the standard scheme suggested
in the test manual. Fluency (number of responses) and
originality (number of unique responses) scores for
each problem- solving task and a fluency score for each
problem-finding task were generated. The scores were
summed across the subtests to yield scores for WallachKogan problem-solving fluency (WKF), problem-solving originality (WKO), and problem-finding fluency
(WKPF).
Real- World Divergent Thinking Test. A Real-World
Divergent Thinking Test, adapted from Okuda, Runco,
and Berger (1991), was used in this study. The adaptation for the present study contained situations and
problems relevant for second-grade children. In this
study, four real-world divergent thinking tasks (two
problem-solving and two problem-finding tasks) were
used. All tasks were related to a school situation. In the
real-world problem-solving tasks, students heard problems related to school life read aloud by the examiner.
Students were asked to provide as many solutions as
possible. For the real-world problem-finding tasks, students heard problematic vignettes about school life and
were asked to list all the problems they could think of
in each of these settings. The problem-solving tasks
were scored for fluency (number of responses given,
RWF) and originality (number of unique responses produced by less than 5% of children in the sample, RWO),
and the problem-finding tasks were scored only for fluency (RWPF). Scoring for the Wallach- Kogan Creativity Test and the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test
was done by the first author and two trained graduate
students. The agreement between the three scorers was
95% or higher across all subtests of the two divergent
thinking tests.
Performance-based assessments. Three performancebased assessments were utilized in this study. The three
assessments included: a storytelling task (language),
a collage-making task (art), and a math word-problem task (math). All tasks were selected from various
sources using Amabile’s (1983, 1996) guidelines for selecting appropriate tasks for a consensual assessment.
Amabile (1996) indicated that an appropriate task for
a consensual assessment should meet the following requirements: (1) the task must lead to some product that
can be available to appropriate judges for evaluation,
and (2) the task should be open-ended enough to permit
flexibility and novelty in children’s responses.
The storytelling and the collage-making tasks for the
present study were developed by Amabile (1983), and
have been validated in more than 30 independent studies by Amabile (1983, 1996), her colleagues, and others
(Baer, 1991, 1993). High interrater reliability and long-
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term validity have been reported for these tasks (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Bear, 1994b). For the storytelling task,
each individual child was shown the picture book A
Boy, a Dog, a Frog, and a Friend (Mayer, 1971). After looking through it to become familiar with the story, the
child was asked to tell a story in his or her own words
by saying one thing about each page while looking at
the book’s pictures. For the collage-making task, each
child was given identical sets of materials to work with:
a 14” x 22” piece of white tag board, a bottle of glue, and
a set of more than 100 precut pieces of construction paper in several different sizes, shapes, and colors. Each
child was asked to make an interesting, silly design using all the materials provided.
The math word-problem task was adapted from
Baer’s (1991) study, where high interrater reliability information was reported. For the math word-problem
task, children were asked to tell an interesting and original math word problem. Children were not asked to
solve the problem they created, but instructed to make
sure all needed information was included so that the
problem could be solved by someone else. Children
were instructed that they could use paper and pencil to
create their math problems.
All performance-based assessments were judged
for their creativity by nine expert judges (three judges
in each domain) selected for this study. Based on Amabile’s (1996) guidelines on consensual techniques for
creativity assessment, judges were selected based on
their experience and expertise in each domain. For each
domain, teachers who had specialized credentials and
at least five years of experience in teaching children’s
creative writing, art, or math were selected as judges
for the study. To avoid any biases (e.g., settings, time
of the day, moods, etc.) in scoring, all judges gathered at the same place and at the same time for four
hours and had no knowledge of the identity of the author of each product. Each judge made his or her assessment independently in a separate room and rated
children’s products on a 1.0 (low) to 5.0 (high) numerical scale based on his or her own definition of creativity. As recommended by Amabile (1983, 1996), judges
were not trained to agree with one another, nor given
specific criteria for creativity. However, judges were
instructed to rate children’s products relative to other
students’ products of the task examined, rather than
rating them against some absolute standards. Amabile
suggested this is important because the levels of creativity produced by the ordinary children would be
low in comparison with the greatest works produced
in that domain. Once the judgments in all performancebased assessments were completed, the judges’ ratings
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on each assessment were analyzed for interjudge reliability. Children’s scores on each assessment were calculated by averaging the three judges’ ratings. Judges
were paid for their work in this study.
Procedures
All the measures, except one performance-based assessment, were administered individually and untimed.
A small, quiet, and simply decorated room in each participating school was used to carry out each individually administered assessment. The examiner made an
effort to establish rapport with each child in the assessment setting before the assessment was undertaken, and
all the measures were administered in a game-like atmosphere. In most cases, all measures were administered during one session in about a 30-minute to 1-hour
time period. To avoid any order effect in the administration procedure, all measures were administered in
the same sequence with the Wallach-Kogan Creativity
Test given first, followed by the Real-World Divergent
Thinking Test, storytelling, and math word-problem. If
the child displayed some fatigue or disinterest during
the testing, testing was stopped and administered at another time. One performance-based assessment, collage
making, was administered in a small-group setting at a
time convenient to classroom teachers. All assessments
were coded by number, not by child’s name or child’s
ID, to avoid any biases in scoring.
Results
Divergent Thinking Skills
The reliability of each divergent thinking test was
evaluated with inter-item correlations (Cronbach’s alpha). Alpha coefficients were calculated for each subtest score of the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test and the
Real-World Divergent Thinking Test, respectively. The
alpha coefficients for the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test
and the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test were quite
high and all adequate. Table 1 presents the alpha coefficients with the means, standard deviations, and range
of subtest scores for the two divergent thinking tests
used in the study. Pearson correlation was used to examine the within and between relationships of the two
divergent thinking tests. Table 2 presents these results.
The Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test subtest scores, problem-solving fluency (WKF), problem-solving originality (WKO), and problem- finding fluency (WKPF) were
strongly and significantly related to each other. Simi-
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larly, the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test subtest
scores were also significantly related to each other, except the relationship between the problem-solving originality score (RWO) and problem-finding fluency score
(RWPF; r = .206). Furthermore, all subtest scores of the
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test were significantly related to the scores of the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test.
Creative Performances
Likewise, interjudge reliabilities were calculated for
the storytelling, collage-making, and math word-problem-creating tasks using the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. As shown in Table 3, interjudge agreement among
the three judges in each domain was fairly high in this
study. Ensuring high interjudge reliability is the most
important criterion of a consensual assessment procedure, since interjudge reliability in a study like this is
equivalent to construct validity (Amabile, 1996).
Is Creative Performance in One Domain Predictive of
Performance in Other Domains?
Pearson correlations were conducted to explore the
relationships among the three performance-based assessments of storytelling, collage making, and the math
word-problem. Among the three performance-based assessments, the only significant relationship was found
between the storytelling and the math word-problem
(r = .283, p = .004). However, storytelling was not significantly related to collage making, nor was the math
word-problem related to collage making. Although statistically significant, the correlation between the storytelling and math tasks was relatively weak (r = .283),
and the weak correlation made it difficult to predict
one task from the other. Table 4 shows the correlations
among the three performance-based assessments for the
109 children.
Do General Creative Thinking Skills Predict Creative
Performances?
Several statistical analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the two divergent thinking
tests used in this study and the three performance-based
assessments. First, Pearson correlation analyses were
conducted to examine the relationships between the
Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test (WK), the Real-World
Divergent Thinking Test (RW), and the three performance-based assessments. Table 5 presents the detailed
results.
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Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation, Range, and Alpha Coefficient for Subtest Scores of the WallachKogan Creativity Test and the Real-World Divergent
Thinking Test
Measures

M

SD

Range Alpha

Wallach-Kogan
Problem-solving tasks
Fluency

36.60

20.20 9-101

.93

5.62

6.33 0-34

.84

23.33

11.87 8-69

.77

Fluency

9.20

6.82 1-43

.94

Originality

1.01

2.48 0-13

.90

11.25

9.42 0-60

.89

Originality
Problem-finding tasks
Fluency
Real-World
Problem-solving tasks

Problem-finding tasks
Fluency

Two of the six subtest scores of the two divergent
thinking tests were significantly related to the storytelling task (p < .01). The highest correlation existed for
the Wallach-Kogan problem-solving originality score
(WKO; r = .365). No significant relationship was found
between any of the subtest scores of the two divergent
thinking tests and the math word-problem task or collage-making tasks.
Multiple regression analyses were also conducted to
examine how much of the variances for the three performance- based assessments were explained by the six
subtest scores of the Wallach-Kogan and the Real-World
Divergent Thinking Tests. Examination of the regression
analysis reveals that the six subtest scores of the two divergent thinking tests did not explain significant nor
substantial proportions of the variances (at p < .01 level)
in any of the three performance-based assessments. The
results indicated, however, that the six subtest scores of
the two divergent thinking tests accounted for a marginally significant 14% (p = .02) of the variance in the storytelling task. The six subtest scores accounted for only
8% of the variance in the collage-making and 5.7% in the
math word-problem tasks.
The results were similar when multiple regression
analyses were conducted for each divergent thinking
test. Specifically, the three subtest scores of the WallachKogan Creativity Test accounted for about 13.6% (p =
.002) of the variance in storytelling, 4.3% in math, and
only 2.7% in collage making. The three subtest scores
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Table 2. Pearson Correlations Between the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test and Real-World Divergent Thinking Test (N = 109)

WKF

WKF

WKO

WKPF

RWF

RWO

RWPF

1.00

.746*

.810*

.634*

.449*

.568*

1.00

.595*

.510*

.524*

.331*

1.00

.558*

.365*

.601*

1.00

.640*

.369*

1.00

.206

WKO 		

WKPF 			

RWF 				

RWO 					

RWPF 						

1.00

WKF = WK problem-solving fluency; WKO = WK problem-solving originality; WKPF = WK problem-finding fluency; RWF = RW problem-solving fluency; RWO = RW problem-solving originality; RWPF = RW problem-finding fluency
* p < 0.01
Table 3. Mean Ratings, Standard Deviations, and
Alpha Coefficient for the Three Performance-Based
Assessments (N = 109)

Table 4. Pearson Correlations Between Storytelling,
Collage Making, and the Math Word Problem (N =
109)

Tasks

M*

SD

Alpha

Tasks

Storytelling

2.37

1.12

.88

Storytelling

Collage
Making

Math
Problem

Collage making

2.91

1.21

.94

Storytelling

1.00

.072

.238*

Math word-problem

2.26

1.25

.92

1.00

.195

* Rating: 1 (not creative) to 5 (highly creative).

of the Real- World Divergent Thinking Test did not explain a significant proportion of the variances in any
of the three performance- based assessments, but accounted for only a marginally significant 8% (p = .04) of
the variance in storytelling, 5.1% in collage making, and
1.4% in math word-problem tasks.
Although the multiple regression analysis provides
information about the extent to which the WallachKogan Creativity Test and the Real-World Divergent
Thinking Test explain and predict each dependent variable (performance-based assessments) separately, the
procedure ignores the very essence and richness of a
multifaceted phenomenon between the multiple dependent and independent variables. Canonical correlations,
therefore, were used to demonstrate an interrelationship
between these two sets of multiple variables.
Canonical analysis was conducted to explain the extent to which one set of criterion variables (storytelling, collage making, and math word-problems) were
predicted or explained by another set of predictor vari-

Collage making			

Math word-problem 					

1.00

* p < 0.01
ables (the six subtest scores of the two divergent thinking tests). Results indicated that the predictor variate
was not significantly correlated with the criterion variate (Rc = .407, c2 [100] = 24.23, p = .148). Any combination of the six subtests did not explain or predict significantly any combination of the three performance-based
assessments. The divergent thinking measures and the
creative performances in three domains were independent of one another. Because no significant correlation
was found between the two sets of variables, no further
analysis was made.
Discussion
Creativity as Domain-Specific
The results of the study suggest that there is considerable intra-individual variation in creative ability by domain in the 109 second-grade children who participated
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Table 5. Pearson Correlations for the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test, the Real-World Divergent Thinking Test, and Three Performance-Based Assessments (N = 109)
Measures

Storytelling

WKF
WKO
WKPF
RWF
RWO
RWPF

.306*
.365*
.231
.243
.247
.157

Collage
Making
.069
.150
.073
–.011
.038
.197

Math
Problem
.120
.192
.135
.026
.019
.116

WKF = WK problem-solving fluency; WKO = WK
problem-solving originality; WKPF = WK problemfinding fluency; RWF = RW problem-solving fluency; RWO = RW problem-solving originality; RWPF
= RW problem-finding fluency
* p < 0.01
in the study. Children in the study exhibited a range of
creative abilities across different domains, rather than
a uniform creative ability in diverse domains. It is implied from the study that it is hard to predict reliably
a child’s creative ability in one domain based on his
or her creative ability in other domains, thereby providing some support for the domain-specific theory of
creativity.
Although a significant relationship existed between
storytelling and math word-problem tasks in the whole
sample of 109 children, the correlation between the
tasks was weak (r = .283) and not substantial at all. This
weak but significant relationship might be explained in
the fact that both tasks utilized a similar task format.
In the storytelling task, children were asked to generate a story based on a wordless picture book, and in the
math word-problem, children were asked to make up
a math-related story problem. The fact that both tasks
required verbal explanations might be responsible for
the significant relationship between the storytelling and
math word-problem tasks. The weak but significant relationship between the tasks also might be attributed
to individual “style” that is defined as a manner of approaching and accomplishing tasks (Miller, 1991). As
Adams (1993) suggested, the weak but significant correlation between such tasks may reflect the systematic
influence of style, rather than links between the content areas themselves. Adams indicated that, if individuals adopt the same style in two different tasks, the
positive and significant correlation between the tasks
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is the function of style, not a true reflection of association between different knowledge domains. However,
whether the weak but significant correlation between
the storytelling and math word-problem tasks is attributed to domain-general creative ability, similar task format, individual’s style toward a task, or other affective
factors that may cut across domains-such as creative
self-efficacy or motivation-cannot be explained empirically in this study. Replication would be useful in examining whether similar patterns are found in further
studies and in exploring possible causes for association
between the tasks.
Taken together, these findings are in contrast to the
previous research (e.g., Hocevar, 1980; Hong, Milgram,
& Gorsky, 1995) that suggested that creative performances in different domains for young children were
significantly related to each other and rather domaingeneral. The results also stand out against the commonly held claim that children are creative in many
different domains. These findings are, then again, consistent with some other earlier research (e.g., Baer, 1991)
that suggested creative performances are domain-specific. By employing a large sample of 109 children and
utilizing performance-based assessments (not depending on self-report scales) to assess creative ability in
children, however, this study provides a more valid response to the controversial issue of the domain-specificity and -generality of creativity. Nevertheless, because
no study to date (including this one) has found absolute independence or dependence between tasks in different domains, interpretation and conclusion regarding
creativity’s domain-generality and -specificity should be
made very carefully.
Divergent Thinking as a General Creative Thinking
Ability
One of the most striking findings of the study was
that divergent thinking measures did not have great
power in predicting creative performances in at least
two of three, if not all, domains assessed in the study.
Neither of the divergent thinking tests administered in
the study, separately or in a battery, predicted real creative behaviors of 109 young children. The amount of
variances explained by the two divergent thinking tests
in the collage and math tasks were relatively small. Although two subtests of the Wallach-Kogan Creativity
Tests were significantly related to the storytelling performance, the amount of variance explained by the two
divergent measures, separately or in a battery, was not
substantial. In creativity research, “good” test correlations with outside validating criteria run between .40
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and .65 because of the host of factors affecting test and
criterion data (Bartlett & Davis, 1974). None of the correlations between the two divergent thinking tests and
the storytelling task reached this range of “good.” More
importantly, the canonical correlation indicated that the
two divergent thinking tests and children’s creative performances in the three domains were independent of
one another.
The findings of the study both complement and contrast with earlier research. These findings are consistent
with some of the previous research in that divergent
thinking measures were often weakly but significantly
related to creative activities in the language domain (i.e.,
storytelling, writing), but not to creative behaviors in
other domains (Baer, 1991; Runco, 1986). The current results suggest a possible verbal bias in divergent thinking tests; however, the use of only one nonverbal subtest
(from the Wallach-Kogan Creativity Test) in the present
study may have contributed to these results.
The results also contrast with earlier research efforts
(e.g., Bartlett & Davis, 1974; Hocevar, 1980; Hong, Milgram, & Gorsky, 1995; Torrance, 1972; Wallach & Kogan,
1965; Wallach & Wing, 1969) that have found significant
relationships between divergent thinking measures and
diverse creative performances (i.e., leadership, art, social service, literature, writing, math, science, crafts).
As indicated, the contrast might be due to the fact that
the earlier research has depended on self-report scales
to measure children’s creative performances in different
domains. As indicated, self-report scales, however, have
been criticized for their questionable validity and the response-set bias that may lead individuals to systematically underestimate or overestimate their creative behaviors across all domains (Baer, 1999).
Overall, these findings of the present study suggest
the lack, if not absence, of general creative thinking
skills in explaining children’s creative performances. On
the other hand, the results might be interpreted as saying that divergent thinking measures may not represent
a general creative thinking ability appropriately. These
findings have important practical implications, since divergent thinking tests are widely used to identify creative children in a wide variety of domains, and they are
often regarded as a criterion, rather than a correlate or
predictor of creative behavior.
Despite these findings, this study is admittedly limited in several ways. Children in the present study were
assessed only once for their creative performances. It
may be possible that creative performance measured
at other times and in other settings will show different
results. In addition, use of a single task to sample children’s creative ability in each domain may not suffi-
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ciently reveal the children’s true abilities for a given
domain (Leondar, 1977). Use of at least two tasks in
the same domain, gathering data through observation
in class over time, or both could minimize any distortion that may happen during one-shot assessments and
provide more valid evidences of creative performances
across domains in young children. Furthermore, the adaptation of the divergent thinking tests used in the present study and the order of item administration may
have affected the results of the present study. Replication of the study should be made to find any possible effects of these factors.
Better understanding of the domain-generality and
-specificity of creativity might also be possible if separate additional analyses of creative and noncreative
groups of children were used. Studying these groups
separately for example, in examining the relationship
between general creative thinking skills and creative
performances would increase the understanding of the
domain issue of creativity. Such analyses need large
sample sizes and unfortunately could not be addressed
in this study.
Future research should explore whether the “process” of creative performance in different domains is
general or specific to a particular domain. Identifying
the important (social/psychological) variables that influence creative performances in diverse domains in
young children and how the variables interact with each
other remains unknown. Finally, systematic observation
of four groups of children who are both creative and divergent, who are creative but not divergent, who are not
creative but divergent, and neither creative nor divergent would also provide interesting information for the
domain issue of creativity.
Implications of the Study
One of the most critical issues in gifted education has
been its failure to identify appropriately and plan adequately programs for all young gifted children. The major cause of our failure has been the procedure currently
employed to assess and identify giftedness and creativity in our school systems. The findings of this study
suggest that creative performances may be quite (but
not absolutely) domain-specific in young children, and
some divergent thinking tests (or subtests) as a measure of creative abilities in young children may not be as
valid as we have thought. It is obvious from this study
that there are various kinds of creativity, and it is hard
to predict reliably a child’s creative ability in one domain based on his or her creative ability in other do-
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mains or simply his or her divergent thinking test scores
in all cases. This study clearly indicates that an appreciable number of children who score low on divergent
thinking tests can be identified as “creative” by their
creative performances using different measures of creativity. Furthermore, the results imply that we may
overlook many extremely creative children and prevent
their enrollment in gifted education programs if we establish a level on some single standardized measure of
creativity without considering each child’s performance
strengths and weaknesses.
Use of multiple assessments in diverse domains and
performance-based assessments within real learning
contexts are essential to assessing properly the different
kinds of creative abilities in various children. To accomplish this goal, however, more effort should be made to
develop and validate appropriate means for assessing
diverse creative abilities.
The proposed domain-specific approach in identifying creative children has various advantages over current identification procedures that are rooted in domain-general philosophy and depend on divergent
thinking tests. Most of all, as Gardner (1983) once remarked, domain-specific views of creativity can help
educators shift their interest from “How creative is
she?” to “How is she creative?” By considering specific
strengths of individual children, identification based on
a domain-specific view can provide information about
the nature of creative abilities revealed by a particular
child that might, in turn, suggest how a program might
be designed to challenge effectively the child’s special abilities (Treffinger & Feldhusen, 1996). Once the
specific domains in which individual children demonstrate their creativity are found, Treffinger and Feldhusen have indicated that educational services and interventions can be focused more accurately and effectively
on those, having two goals of “nurturing already recognized creativity in a specific domain” and “discovering/
developing new ones.” So far, these great advantages
of domain-specific approaches, however, have been ignored and overshadowed by the frequent use of divergent thinking tests with subsequent lack of applicability
to instructional planning.
Recent research supports this position by confirming
that specific interventions focused on specific domains
are far more effective than general “gifted treatment,”
which usually offers “all-purpose” enrichment programs for all kinds of gifted children (Bloom, 1985; Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen, 1993; Treffinger &
Feldhusen, 1996). Enormous evidences have suggested
that our gifted children are poorly served by standard
enrichment programs that do not consider seriously
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their individuality (U.S. Office of Education, 1993).
However, this is not arguing that we should abandon
the current programs of teaching general thinking skills
or problem-solving skills in our schools. Even with all
the negatives mentioned on the above, there is no doubt
that improving children’s creative thinking and problem-solving abilities in diverse domains are essential educational goals (Treffinger, 1986; Treffinger & Feldhusen, 1996). In fact, general creative thinking skills can
and should continue to be encouraged in every domain
and area of giftedness and talent. Individualized and
domain-based approaches, coordinated with current
programs for teaching thinking skills or problem-solving skills, however, may be the best way to address the
increasing diversity in our school systems.
Currently, an extensive paradigm shift in the field of
gifted education is occurring: the movement of “talent
development” (Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde, & Whalen,
1993; Gagne, 1985; Renzulli, 1994; Treffinger, 1995; Treffinger & Feldhusen, 1996; VanTassel-Baska, 1997). Educators of gifted children are being challenged to take
account of the proposition that recognition and development of various talents among children are the most
powerful contribution to education (Feldman, 1980; Treffinger, 1995). Clearly, the idea of domain-specificity of
creativity seems to reflect this current trend, and the talent development approach firmly supports the identification and development of an individual child’s creative
ability in a particular domain. One main idea behind
these new concepts is appreciating and responding to
individual differences, thereby more broadly recognizing and developing many kinds of human strengths and
talents.
In closing, the question of domain-generality and
-specificity in cognitive abilities, including creativity,
might not be the unanswerable riddle that Sternberg
(1989) once mentioned it was. It is true, however, that it
is a very complicated and difficult question. As Keating
and Crane (1990) have noted, “dichotomies in thinking
are sometimes useful, sometimes misleading, but apparently unavoidable” (p. 411). The evidences from this
study and other research support the perspective that a
domain-general view of creativity has often misguided
the identification of and educational practices for our
creative children. Domain-general views of creativity
that seek to reinforce the “generality,” rather than viewing it the other way around, are too limited, but have
been maintained for the sake of today’s status quo in
identifying creative children in our school systems. A
domain-specific view may offer more useful, flexible,
and reasonable directions for identifying and educating
creative potentials for their optimal developments.
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